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WOMEN AND CONTRACTS: NO NEW DEAL 
Elizabeth S. Anderson* 
THE SEXUAL CONTRACT. By Carole Pateman. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1988. Pp. xi, 264. $12.95. 
Is contractarian political theory inherently patriarchal? Does it in-
evitably legitimate men's domination of women? In The Sexual Con-
tract, Carole Pateman 1 exposes the patriarchal origins of classical 
social contract tlieory, and argues that these origins cannot be over-
come in modern versions of the theory. According to Pateman, con-
tracts do not enable men and women to enter into cooperative 
relations on terms of equality. Rather, their function is to legitimate 
patriarchal and other forms of domination under the guise of equality. 
If Pateman's thesis is true, one of the most important strains of liberal 
political theory is seriously undermined. For liberalism aims to give 
every member of liberal society good reasons to accept its institutions, 
while Pateman's arguments imply that women, at least, have good rea-
sons to reject contractarian justifications of liberal institutions. 
Pateman's book is not only directed against liberalism as such. She 
also aims to persuade feminists to change the terms of political dis-
course which structure many feminist debates. Feminist theory today 
appears to be caught between the seemingly mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive alternatives of seeking "equality" with men, on the one 
hand, and seeking respect and space for "difference" from men, on the 
other. Each alternative poses its characteristic difficulties. The 
"equality" perspective, usually called liberal feminism, identifies the 
feminist goal with achieving equal rights, opportunities, and powers 
relative to men.2 In practice, the equality view calls upon women to 
become more like men, for it accepts rather than challenges prevailing 
(male) standards of evaluation and qualification for offices, opportuni-
ties, and rights. This position accepts the social devaluation of the 
practices, characteristics, and values that society labels "feminine," or 
at least their irrelevance for determining the allocation of rights, op-
portunities, and powers traditionally reserved for men. 
Although the bulk of Pateman's argument is directed against the 
equality perspective, because of its focus on contracts as a means for 
women to achieve equality, she opposes the "difference" perspective as 
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. A.M. 1984, Harvard Univer-
sity; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1987, Harvard University. 
1. Reader in Government, University of Sydney, Australia. 
2. For discussions of the equality view, see A. PHILLIPS, FEMINISM AND EQUALITY (1987). 
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well. The "difference" perspective celebrates the distinctive views, 
achievements, and dispositions which supposedly characterize women, 
and aims to give them larger social spaces in which to function. 3 But 
since women's differences have been created under conditions of op-
pression, the difference perspective in practice affirms characteristics 
which bear the marks of adaptation and resignation to oppression, and 
thereby encourages women to opt out of activities that challenge men's 
domination. 4 
Pateman argues that these two apparently exclusive and exhaustive 
alternatives are in fact mutually complementary constructions within 
modern liberal patriarchal society. The liberal division between public 
and private spheres of life, legitimated by social contract theory, is 
responsible for offering women both alternatives: difference and sub-
ordination in the private sphere, and (ostensibly) equality and same-
ness with men in the public sphere (pp. 226-27). To escape this 
unproductive framing of the issues, feminists must understand their 
primary task to be the elimination of patriarchal oppression of women, 
which requires a repudiation of the liberal distinction between public 
and private spheres. How this repudiation is to be understood, how-
ever, and how it will enable women to participate fully in society as 
women without being oppressed, are matters Pateman does not reveal 
to us in The Sexual Contract. 
So Pateman's critique of social contract theory is incomplete: the-
ories are only fully refuted by exhibiting a superior alternative. How-
ever, the incompleteness of her critique does not take away its 
significance. If it is sound, it offers us compelling reasons to look be-
yond social contract theory for political guidance. The rest of this 
review scrutinizes Pateman's critique of social contract theory by 
means of two questions: How accurate is her analysis of the patriar-
chal character of classical social contract theory? Does she success-
fully argue that no modern social contract theory can overcome these 
patriarchal origins? 
I. CLASSICAL SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
The aims of classical social contract theory are to determine the 
legitimate forms of government, and to determine the grounds of any 
given individual's obligation to obey a legitimate state. All social con-
tract theorists assume that the political order is a social construct, not 
a natural form of association. It is legitimate if and only if it is (or 
3. See, e.g., c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. NODDINGS, CARING (1984). 
4. The recent Sears employment discrimination case, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. 
Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), in which feminists testified for 
both sides, illustrates some of the conflicts between the equality and difference perspectives. For 
critiques of this dichotomy with reference to the Sears case, see Scott, Reconstructing Equality-
versus-Dijference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEM. STUD. 33 
(1988); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 813-21 (1989). 
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could be) the outcome of a collective agreement of free, equal, and 
rational individuals. And a given individual is obligated to obey a par-
ticular state if and only if he has actually consented to its authority. 
In the absence of a political order, individuals stand in a "state of 
nature" in relation to one another - without any common political 
authority (i.e., a state) in existence to adjudicate their disputes. All 
legitimate powers of the state are derived from such individuals, who 
agree to transfer their natural rights and liberties to the state (and 
thereby agree to obey it) in return for the benefits of political order, 
mainly protection of their lives and property. The versions of classical 
contractarian th~ory are distinguished by how they understand the 
freedom, equality, and rationality of individuals, what the conditions 
of the state of nature which motivate individuals to form a political 
order would be like, and what actions constitute consent. 
Social contract theory would, at first glance, seem an ideally suited 
vehicle for attacking patriarchy, or the political power of men over 
women. Patriarchy is traditionally legitimated by appeals to natural 
differences between men and women, whereas social contract theory 
denies that political power is based upon natural differences. Patri-
archy is traditionally assumed to be a matter of the lower status 
ascribed to women without their consent: If men could assert legiti-
mate power over women only by their consent in a valid contract, how 
could men have such power at all? Finally, patriarchy traditionally 
depends upon an analogy between the legitimate authority of the fa-
ther as the head of a household and the authority of the ruler as the 
head of state. But social contract theory sharply separates the public 
and private sph~res, and denies the analogy between paternal and 
political power. 
Pateman argues that patriarchy was not really rejected by classical 
social contract theory, but simply continued in a specifically modern 
form. This fact has been obscured by the patriarchal conceptual 
framework that social contract theory uses to present itself. The spe-
cifically modern form of patriarchy is not that of the rule of fathers 
over other members of the household, but the rule of men over their 
wives or other women to which they have sexual access. In particular, 
it consists in the conjugal right of men to sexual access to their wives 
or female servants (p. 9). 
Classical social contract theory challenges the identification of 
political power with paternal power, and hence rejects traditional pa-
triarchy based upon father-right. This gives it the appearance of being 
an anti-patriarchal theory. But it accepts the traditional pre-con-
tractarian assumption that men have legitimate authority over and un-
restricted sexual access to their wives and female servants, and hence 
accepts patriarchy based upon male sex-right (pp. 2-3). And it at-
tempts to show that, if this authority is not a natural one, it is 
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grounded in women's consent in a sexual contract. Thus, contract is 
the specifically modern means by which patriarchy is legitimated. 
Furthermore, the key to men's domination of women in the political 
sphere lies in the sexual contract. 5 Classical contractarian theory ob-
scures this fact because most versions of it sharply distinguish private, 
domestic power from political power. In fact, however, it uses the fact 
that men exercise domestic power over women in the private sphere 
to legitimate women's exclusion from participation in the political 
sphere. 
A key problem of classical social contract theory is to explain how 
women are subject to the political authority of the state if they are 
excluded from political participation. According to the classical the-
ory, all individuals are born free and equal. That is, they are not polit-
ically subject to anyorie else's authority, and they equally enjoy certain 
natural powers and liberties, notably, to acquire property, to defend 
themselves by whatever means they deem reasonable, and to judge the 
merits of their own case in disputes with others. The political author-
ity of the state is derived solely from a contract whereby each individ-
ual agrees to surrender his natural liberties and obey the state in return 
for protection of his life and property. But no classical contractarian 
included women in the social contract which gives rise to the state. 
How, then, are women incorporated into civil society? If women have 
not given their consent to be ruled in the social contract, why are they 
nevertheless subject to the state's authority? The general answer to 
this question is that women are incorporated into civil society through 
their husbands or male masters. 6 The universal scope of the authority 
of the state is ensured only by presupposing the. universality of the 
marriage or sexual contract, by which women have already 
subordinated themselves to men before the state is constructed. When 
men enter the social contract, therefore, they dispose of both their own 
and their wives' natural liberties. 
Pateman's distinctive contribution to our understanding of classi-
cal social contract theory is her analysis of the various means by which 
the sexual contract is used to ensure the political subordination of wo-
men to men before the social contract is made. In general, there are 
three contractarian strategies for ensuring this, corresponding to the 
5. The sexual contract includes any agreement by which men gain rights over women's sex-
ual and reproductive capacities. The marriage contract is its typical, but not universal, form. 
6. G. SCHOCHET, PATRIARCHALISM IN PoLmCAL THOUGHT (1975). As Schochet demon-
strates, classical social contract theory does not even assume that all men participate in the con-
struction of the state. Only heads of households do so; all family dependents, including children, 
adult servants, apprentices, slaves, and wives are incorporated into civil society by their domestic 
rulers. Id. at 12. Schochet thus demonstrates the falsehood of the conventional atomistic inter-
pretation of the social contract theorists, according to which only individuals exist in the state of 
nature and make the social contract. Households are the fundamental units in the state of na-
ture, and the parties to the social contract act not as individuals, but as heads of households, in 
consenting to the authority of the state. Id. at 56, 254-55. 
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strategies of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke, respectively: (1) assume 
the strict equality of men and women and allow conquest to count as a 
legitimate form •of consent; (2) abandon the assumption of sexual 
equality, and ground women's subordination to men directly in an as-
sumption of women's natural inferiority and incapacity to participate 
in political affairs, regardless of their consent; (3) assume that women 
are naturally inferior to men in a way that gives women rationally 
compelling grounds for consenting to their subordination in marriage. 
Each of these strategies, we shall see, manages to secure patriarchy for 
classical social contract theorists only in highly contingent, untenable, 
or contradictory. ways. 
Consider first the Hobbesian solution. Hobbes was alone among 
the classical social contract theorists in assuming strict equality be-
tween men and women, and denying that there is any natural subjec-
tion between human beings. All subjection, Hobbes argued, even of 
children to their mother, is achieved through consent. 7 But this just 
goes to show how weak a notion "consent" is in Hobbes' theory. Sub-
mission to an overwhelming power, as in the cases of conquest and 
maternal authority over children, counts as consent in Hobbes' view 
just as much as do contracts made without threats or duress. This is 
important, for in the state of nature no contracts are valid, because 
there is no common political authority with the power to enforce 
them. So families in the state of nature are founded not upon a mar-
riage contract but upon conquest. And all conquest creates relations 
of political subordination. When a man conquers his wife, she con-
sents to relinquish all of her rights (except that of self-defense, which is 
inalienable) to her husband. His political power over her in the state 
of nature is just as great as Leviathan's over his subjects in civil soci-
ety. On the assumption that all women are conquered by men and 
incorporated into a family before the social contract, Hobbes had no 
difficulty in accounting for the political subjection of women to men in 
civil society. Since men form the commonwealth, they make sure that 
the civil laws of marriage endorse the terms of the original sexual 
conquest.8 
The basic problem with Hobbes' derivation of patriarchy from the 
social contract is that he has no argument to show that all women will 
be conquered by men in the state of nature. What about unmarried 
women, widows, and dominant women who form their own house-
holds through conquest? As Pateman points out, Hobbes rejected the 
assumption that there are any natural sexual differences which ensure 
the universal subjection of women to men.9 Hobbes himself believed 
7. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. II, ch. 20, paras. 1, 2, 4, 11 (Penguin English Library rev. ed. 
1981) (1651). 
8. Id., at para. 4. 
9. Pateman considers the possibility that women become competitively disadvantaged be-
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that some commonwealths are founded by women, so he admitted that 
his derivation of patriarchy from the social contract is entirely contin-
gent.10 At the same time, however, Hobbes seemed to assume without 
argument that men and women never jointly found commonwealths. 
It is difficult to square this assumption, or the assumption that men 
almost always found commonwealths, with his original assumption of 
strict natural sexual equality. According to Pateman, Hobbes' deriva-
tion of patriarchy would not have suited modern liberal political the-
ory anyway: not only is his egalitarianism too uncompromising to 
support confidently a patriarchal order, but he equated sexual with 
political subjection in a way that prevented any robust differentiation 
of public and private spheres, and exposed the coercive foundation of 
sexual subjection too openly to legitimate it for those who refused to 
equate conquest with consent (p. 44). 
Rousseau secured patriarchy by overtly excluding women from the 
original assumptions of social contract theory. Only men are born free 
and equal in the state of nature; women are naturally inferior and born 
into subjection. They must be subject to men, because they lack the 
capacities for rational self-restraint and self-government to participate 
in political affairs. 11 In The Sexual Contract, Pateman interprets 
Rousseau as claiming that men enjoy a natural authority over women 
which does not need to be validated by women's consent (p. 98). Else-
where she has suggested a more interesting line of interpretation: 
Rousseau as a founder of an ideology of rape, whereby men are the 
sole arbiters of whether a woman has given her consent to sexual sub-
jection.12 Either line of argument supports a patriarchal order, but 
only through a fundamental betrayal of the basic commitments of so-
cial contract theory. The theoretical power of social contract theory 
depends upon its rejection of any arguments for natural subjection of 
some adults to others. If the domination of men over women is natu-
ral, why not the domination of a king over his subjects? If some adults 
can be the sole arbiters of whether others have consented, why can't a 
king assert an authoritative claim to determine whether his subjects 
have consented to his rule?13 
cause they have children. But on Hobbes' egoist assumptions, women would simply abandon 
their children rather than submit to conquest by a man if doing so would enable them to preserve 
their liberty. P. 49. 
10. T. HOBBES, supra note 7, at pt. II, ch. 20, para. 4. 
11. J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE OR ON EDUCATION 364, 370, 396 (A. Bloom tr. 1979). 
12. Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 PoL. THEORY 149, 154-55 (1980). According to Rous-
seau, women must be trained to be modest - to be taught to say "no" to a sexual advance even 
when they mean "yes." It is up to the man to decide when a woman's "no" means "yes." J. 
ROUSSEAU, supra note 11, at 348. This raises the problem: If women's incapacity to govern 
themselves and restrain their passions is the basis for their exclusion from political participation, 
then wouldn't it also make their training in modesty impossible? 
13. This last point is one on which the classical theorists are especially vulnerable, because of 
their need to define consent very weakly in order to ensure its universality. Hence Hobbes' 
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Locke's strategy is the most interesting of the three, attempting to 
combine an assumption of natural sexual inequality with the need for 
consent to legitimate all forms of authority between adults. Unfortu-
nately, Pateman sometimes assimilates Locke's strategy to Rousseau's, 
flatly ascribing to Locke the view that women are naturally 
subordinate to men and inherently incapable of participating in polit-
ical affairs; never free and equal but "born into subjection."I4 Locke, 
in a passage ignored by Pateman, explicitly repudiates any naturalistic 
basis of women's subjection, pointing out that if this were so, queens 
could not be rulers, and if husbandly authority were political author-
ity, then queens would lose their sovereignty upon marriage. Is 
In fact, it is clear from the Second Treatise that Locke believed that 
men gain authority over their wives only through consent, and that 
this authority is strictly limited. Locke insisted that marriage in the 
state of nature grants husband and wife equal authority over their chil-
dren; moreover, the wife retains her right to own property, is free to 
divorce her husband once their children are grown, and is subject to 
her husband only in matters of common interest in the marriage. I6 A 
more consistent reading of Locke than Pateman's would suggest that, 
while he believed that women have the same natural liberties as men 
and hence are legitimately subject to another adult only through their 
consent, their natural weakness makes it rational for them to consent 
to partial subjection to their husbands in marriage. 
Nevertheless,· Pateman rightly argues that Locke achieves the ap-
pearance of anti-patriarchalism while legitimizing a new form of it in 
the Treatises (pp. 91-94). The appearance is achieved through Locke's 
sharp distinction between paternal and conjugal rights and political 
rights. The power of a father over his children cannot be the basis for 
political authority, Locke argued, for mothers have equal power over 
assumption that submission to conquest counts as consent, see T. HOBBES, supra note 7, at para. 
11, and Locke's that merely walking on the roads of a state counts as consent, J. Loc1rn, THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT§ 119 (P. Laslett 
ed. 1965). Hume offers a devastating critique of attempts to found obligation on so weak a 
notion of consent. Hume, Of the Original Contract, in EssAYS, MORAL, PoLmCAL, AND LITER-
ARY ch. 12 (E.F. Miller ed. 1985). For a novel reconstruction of consent theory sensitive to 
Hume's concerns, see D. HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES (1989). 
14. Pp. 52, 53. The textual basis for this claim is very thin: a sentence in Locke's First 
Treatise where Locke admits that women's subordination to their husbands has a "foundation in 
nature." J. LocKE, THE FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT in Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT, supra note 13, at§ 47. It is one thing to claim that once a woman consents to marriage, 
her natural lot is to be subordinate to her husband, given the need for a supreme voice in the 
household, as Locke has suggested in this passage and in his Second Treatise. See J. LOCKE, THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at§ 82. It is quite another to argue that 
every woman is "born into subjection" to men, regardless of her consent to enter into a particular 
marriage. Pateman so~etimes acknowledges that the view of women's natural subjection does 
not adequately account for the claims of Locke and other social contract theorists. Pp. 39-40, SO. 
15. J. LoCKE, THE FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at § 47. Locke also 
denies in this passage that women have a moral obligation to consent to subjection in marriage. 
16. J. LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at§§ 78, 81-83. 
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the children. And the conjugal power of a husband over his wife can-
not be the basis for political authority, for this power is limited to the 
concerns of marriage and excludes the specifically political form of 
power - the right to exact penalties of death, and hence all lesser 
penalties, for infractions of the law.17 Pateman points out that Locke 
does not question the husband's conjugal authority over his wife, he 
merely labels it "nonpolitical" and hence not of concern to the state 
{p. 91). But this patriarchal power, however "nonpolitical," still 
reaches deeply - right into women's bodies.18 
Does Locke's legitimation of patriarchy run into problems as deep 
as those encountered by Hobbes and Rousseau? Pateman argues that 
it does: the central contradiction of social contract theory is that it 
must simultaneously assume that women lack and possess the capacity 
to make and uphold contracts. Women need to be able to make con-
tracts, or else they would not be incorporated into civil society 
through the marriage or sexual contract. And yet they cannot make 
contracts, or else they would possess the essential capacity needed to 
qualify for participation in the creation of political order {p. 54). Con-
tractual relations presuppose the natural equality of the parties to a 
contract: otherwise one party would be able to assert the right to rule 
based upon natural difference. But if the parties to any contract are 
natural equals, why should it be that women always consent to subjec-
tion? Some assumption of natural inequality needs to be slipped in to 
support the assumption of the universality of the marriage contract, 
which ensures that all women are incorporated into civil society with-
out their participation in the social contract {pp. 6, 54, 179). 
Pateman's analysis captures one, but overlooks a second contradic-
tion of Locke's social contract theory. In entering the social contract 
on behalf of their dependents, heads of households dispose of natural 
liberties which they do not possess. The social contract theorists (ex-
cept Hobbes) distinguish between political power and the power of a 
husband over his wife or a master over his servant. These pre-political 
relations do not transfer the subordinates' properly political liberties 
to the dominant party in the contract: wives and servants retain the 
17. Id. at§§ 3, 82, 86. 
18. Pateman does not spell out what is at stake in her claim that patriarchal right in marriage 
is a form of political power. Her argument needs to be complete.d by an account of the state, 
such as the one offered recently by Catharine MacKinnon. C. MACKINNON, Tow ARD A FEMI-
NIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). Social contract theory, like liberal theory generally, 
sharply separates the private from the public spheres. The private sphere is supposed to be a 
realm of freedom, not subject to state control. Hence liberal theory places strong obstacles in 
front of state action to eliminate inequalities found there. But inequalities in the private sphere 
are themselves political in nature, since they are enforced by violence against women, and such 
inequalities serve to support inequalities in the public sphere as well. Id. at ch. 8. This fact is not 
recognized by the liberal state: in modem liberal theory, private (domestic) inequality is sup-
posed to be irrelevant to the establishment of political (public) equality. (In classical social con-
tract theory, domestic inequality simply legitimates the exclusion of women from the political 
sphere altogether, allowing the remaining participants in it to be "equals.") 
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right to self-defense and to enforce the laws of nature; they also retain 
all natural liberties which are not a part of the narrow contract with 
their superiors in matters of common interest. Since they do not pos-
sess their dependents' political liberties, heads of households do not 
have the power to transfer these liberties to the state and hence do not 
have the right to incorporate their dependents into civil society. If 
they did have the right to dispose of their dependents' natural liberties, 
then their domestic power would be identical with complete political 
power, and there would be no distinction between public and private 
spheres of life. 
This contradiction remains submerged in classical social contract 
theory because it equivocates on the meaning of political equality. It is 
an axiom of modern political theory that politics takes place only 
among equals. But equals in what respect? On a minimalist reading, , 
equality just means equality of certain political rights or powers. To 
Locke, these are rights of self-defense and self-enforcement of the laws 
of nature. 19 Since these rights are never alienated in any pre-political 
relation, 20 everyone is eligible to participate in the social contract upon 
reaching adulthood. On a maximalist reading, equality means com-
plete independence from anyone else's will; it requires economic self-
sufficiency. Any contract that requires one person to obey another in 
return for subsistence disables that person from political participation. 
But classical contract theory cannot explain how nonpolitical depen-
dence can disqualify one from politics without imputing political 
power to the superior in a supposedly private, nonpolitical 
relationship. 
Thus, it appears that social contract theory provides only uncon-
vincing and contingent justifications for the patriarchal exclusion of 
women from politics, or else self-contradictory justifications for it. 
This conclusion is supported by Pateman's arguments and is further 
strengthened by the observations just made. The classical social con-
tract theorists did 'try to justify patriarchy, but their theory makes it an 
awkward and ultimately untenable project. Shouldn't we conclude, 
then, that contractarian theory promises to be a far more useful tool 
for attacking patriarchy than for defending it?21 Pateman argues that 
19. J. LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at§§ 6-7. 
20. Hobbes does not distinguish political power from domestic power, so his version of the 
theory is not subject to these criticisms. 
21. CJ z. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM (1981) (Liberal the-
ory, properly applied, subverts patriarchal institutions traditionally defended by liberals.). 
Pateman, in earlier wor~, seems to be of two minds on this issue. In one article, she claims that 
the classical consent theorists successfully justified patriarchy in their own terms. Patemnn, 
Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in FEMINISM AND EQUALITY 105 (A. Phil-
lips ed. 1987). In Women and Consent, however, she claims that consent theory has ignored or 
suppressed its most radical implications, suggesting that a deeper understanding of it will under-
mine modem patriarchy. Pateman, supra note 12, at 163. 
Her argument in Women and Consent exhibits a more sophisticated and nuanced understand-
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this is not so: while contractarian theory has seduced many feminists 
into thinking that it provides a viable route to the achievement of 
equality, in fact, it is an inherently patriarchal theory (pp. 14-17). 
How does she reach this conclusion? 
II. MODERN SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
According to Pateman, the key to unlocking the inherently patriar-
chal character of social contract theory lies in its conception of the 
"individual." Pateman identifies the "individual" in social contract 
theory as "possessive": as a person who is related to his body as an 
owner is to a piece of property.22 These individuals regard their own 
bodies, and other people's bodies, as alienable property, and they seek 
to maximize the protection of their own property while seeking the 
acquisition of more property. Contracts provide the primary means 
by which individuals protect and acquire property. Once contracts are 
understood as a vehicle for disposing not merely of property external 
to the body, but also of property in the body itself - that is, rights to 
sexual access, to the capacity to labor, and to act - they constitute a 
powerful tool for creating relations of domination. Expanding the do-
main of fully contractual relations is not a useful tool for feminists 
because contracts legitimate the domination of women. 23 
ing of consent theory than The Sexual Contract. In the earlier piece, she does not fall victim to 
the confusions noted below, which lead her to reject unequivocally the uses of consent theory for 
feminist ends. I have confined my remarks to the contractarian exclusion of women from poli-
tics. Pateman claims that social contract theory has a deeper purpose: to guarantee contractu-
ally that men have access to women's bodies in the domestic sphere. P. 2. The social contract 
does not simply create civil society; it is a contract among "brothers" to ensure their sexual 
access to women. Pp. 102-09. Her claim is based upon a reading of Freud's myth of the origins 
of civilization as really being a myth of the origins of modern civil society. But she does not 
adequately explain what relationship she sees between Freud and the classical theorists. Is it that 
Freud's story is needed to complete and make sense of the classical contractarian myths of polit-
ical origins? Or does it expose the repressed sexual motivations of social contract theorists them-
selves? At any rate, while the social contract theorists presupposed the empirical universality of 
marriage and assumed that most states would uphold a patriarchal form of it, they neither gener-
ally assumed nor tried to guarantee that every man would have the power and right to subdue 
some woman, nor that every woman would be permanently obliged to stand in subjection to 
some man or other. Pp. 102-03, 109. Classical contractarian theory, Rousseau possibly ex-
cepted, thus does not guarantee the "law of male sex-right" in the way or to the degree that 
Pateman supposes. 
22. Pp. 14, 55; cf. c. MACPHERSON, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUAL-
ISM (1962). Pateman derives her concept of the possessive individual from MacPherson, 
although she reinterprets it in terms of a feminist analysis of male sexuality. 
23. Pateman's criticism of contractarianism can be distinguished from two other critiques 
familiar in the literature. One comes from the feminist "difference" perspective, which argues 
that to conceive of the individual as "possessive" and related to others only through self-inter-
ested contracts is to privilege illegitimately a peculiarly masculine self-understanding which wo-
men do not share. Women, rather, conceive of themselves as essentially related to others 
through emotional commitments distinct from self-interest. To give space to this self-under-
standing requires recognition of forms of moral relations to others not founded on masculine 
ideals of objective, impartial, and universal rules of fairness, but on feminine ideals of caring for 
specific others in concrete relationships. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 3. Pateman does not 
consider this argument. And she refuses any help from the standard objection to possessive 
1802 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1792 
There are really two arguments packed into Pateman's analysis, 
one of which explains why contractarianism legitimates the domina-
tion of people generally, and another of which explains why it legiti-
mates the specifically patriarchal domination of women. Consider first 
the contractarian legitimation of generic domination. The examples of 
contract typically employed by the defenders of contractarianism to 
illustrate its advantages involve the exchange of external nonessential 
goods. I own a heap of com; you own a little piece of yellow metal; 
each of us wants what the other has; so we arrange a contract for the 
exchange of our goods. 24 After the exchange, we are as free as before, 
· only better off. 
By equating goods in the person with external property, con-
tractarian theory slips in, under a social form which is supposed to 
preserve the freedom of individuals, a justification for the sustained 
domination of one person by another (p. 148). The important con-
tracts in social c9ntract theory all involve the exchange of property 
necessarily embodied in the person in return for protection or subsis-
tence. But to give to another person rights to property necessarily 
embodied in one's own person is to agree to subjection to that other 
person. The social contract, whereby people give up their natural lib-
erty and agree to obey the state; the employment contract, whereby 
people give up their labor-power to the direction of their employers; 
and the marriage contract, whereby women alienate their sexual and 
reproductive powers to their husbands, all have the same form. They 
all involve the exchange of obedience for protection or subsistence. 
Contract establishes a sustained relation of domination, in which the 
party providing protection has the right to determine what the other 
person must do to fulfill her side of the contract. 
Pateman rightly argues that a contract into sustained relations of 
domination requires some further justification than that it was arrived 
at voluntarily. According to possessive contractarianism, no further 
justification of such relations is needed. But this line of thinking easily 
leads to a justification of a society of masters and slaves, all in the 
name of freedom. Indeed, modem possessive contractarians do not 
flinch from endorsing contracts into "civil slavery."25 This should 
forms of contractarianism, that it ignores the background conditions of inequality and duress 
which undermine the notion that contracts made in the real world, or in the state of nature as 
construed by many theorists, are truly voluntary or fair. Pp. 7, 133. 
24. See J. LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at § 37. 
25. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 331 (1974). A civil slave differs from a 
complete slave only in respect of having a civil status entitling her to use the courts to protect her 
interests. As Pateman notes, the traditional criteria distinguishing free employees from slaves -
compensation in wages (a token of free exchange) rather than in kind, temporary rather than 
permanent subjection, alienation of labor-power rather than the body itself, and civil equality 
with the employer - have no special status within possessive contractarian theory. Pp. 70-73, 
146-47. If all freedoms are necessarily embodied in property rights, and people own their bodies 
as property, they are only completely free if they can completely alienate their bodies for any-
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amount to a reductio ad absurdum of possessive contractarian theory, 
since it conceives of the freedom of the slave as realized through com-
plete subjection to another person, rather than as completely de-
stroyed by it. No conception of the freedom and dignity of persons 
which is worth defending can endorse this kind of social order. 
The above criticisms follow straightforward liberal criticisms of 
possessive versions of contractarianism.26 Pateman's distinctive criti-
cism of the possessive model of the individual in social contract theory 
asserts that it legitimates specifically patriarchal domination. She ar-
gues that this model of the individual is an inherently patriarchal con-
struction (p. 167) because it is essentially male (pp. 184-85). Her 
argument for this point is extremely sketchy, and requires reconstruc-
tion. Essentially, it amounts to the claim that the specifically male 
form of (hetero )sexual desire is constituted by the desire to appropri-
ate a woman's body as a piece of property, to exercise mastery over it 
for one's own sexual use.27 Hence the realization of modem hetero-
sexual masculinity requires a conception of individuals who own their 
bodies as property and can alienate them to men. Contract is simply 
the modem means by which men continue to exercise the "law of male 
sex-right."28 As long as men's access to women's sexual powers is 
conceived and realized as an essentially contractual matter - whether 
in marriage, prostitution, surrogate motherhood, or some other ar-
rangement - and as long as this kind of contractual access is con-
ceived of as essential to the realization of masculinity, women will not 
be able to escape the patriarchal domination of their bodies by men. 
thing they please, whether it comes in the form of wages or subsistence in kind. And since labor-
power is inherently attached to the laborer's body, it cannot be alienated without (partially) 
alienating the body. Pateman might have added that while the civil slave still has a civil status, 
in possessive contractarian theory there is no reason why she cannot effectively alienate this 
status by agreeing to submit disputes with her owner to an arbitrator designated by him. 
26. See pp. 74-75. Indeed, Pateman correctly cites Rousseau, one of the classical contractari-
ans, in opposition to the contractarian justification for civil slavery. P. 75 (citing J. ROUSSEAU, 
THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr bk. I, ch. 4, at 58 (M. Cranston ed. 1968)). She could also have cited 
Locke, who likewise rejected the idea that the condition of slavery can be created legitimately 
through contract, see J. LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at 
§ 23, as well as the idea that one person may contractually force another into political subjection 
by taking advantage of her duress or neediness. J. LoCKE, THE FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERN-
MENT supra note 13, at §§ 41-42. This should have suggested to Pateman that not even the 
classical contractarians, Hobbes excepted, fully endorsed the possessive conception of individu-
als. See also infra note 30. 
27. Pateman writes: 
The individual [in contractarian theory] is masculine and his sexuality is understood accord-
ingly .•.. The patriarchal construction of sexuality, what it means to be a sexual being, is 
to possess and to have access to sexual property .... The "individual" is a man who makes 
use of a woman's body (sexual property); the converse is much harder to imagine. 
Pp. 184-85. Pateman's conception of male sexuality is hardly explained well enough here to 
support the conclusions she draws. Her arguments need to be completed by such accounts as are 
found in the work of other radical feminists. See, e.g., A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN 
POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987). 
28. P. 2. The phrase comes from Adrienne Rich. Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and 
Lesbian Experience, 5 SIGNS 631, 645 (1980). 
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This leads Pateman to argue that feminists should seek liberation in 
forms of relationship that go beyond contractual relations, rather than 
by attempting to perfect the contractual basis of the sexual relations 
they already have with men. 
Speaking as someone who agrees in large measure with the posi-
tion stated in the last sentence, I wish Pateman's argument were more 
successful than it is. But it is flawed by two confusions: (1) between 
particular contracts and contractarian theory; and (2) between posses-
sive contractarian theory and the general form of contractarian the-
ory. The first confusion leads Pateman to suppose that to endorse a 
particular kind of contractual relationship is necessarily to accept the 
conception of the possessive individual which is found in contractarian 
theory. The second confusion leads her to suppose that contractarian 
theory itself necessarily accepts this conception of the possessive 
individual. 
Pateman is right to condemn the model of the possessive individual 
as one which legitimates unjust and patriarchal forms of domination. 
She is right to see in this model one deeply entrenched, patriarchal 
dimension of modern sexuality. And she is right to point out the con-
tinuation of patriarchy in past and present-day contractual forms of 
marriage, prostitution, surrogate motherhood, and employment (chs. 
5-7). But there is a gap between these claims and the rejection of con-
tractual forms as such or contractarian theory in general as useful 
tools for the liberation of women. 
Consider first some differences between contracts and possessive 
contractarian theory. An unqualified possessive contractarian theory 
poses few obstacles to the sustained domination of one person by an-
other which can be achieved through the contractual alienation of 
property in the person. But this does not imply that "contracts about 
property in the person inevitably create subordination."29 Even in 
contemporary capitalist economies, labor contracts do not inherently 
create relations of subordination. Plumbers, academicians, actors, 
athletes, and professionals of all kinds hire out their labor-power for 
pay, but this fact does not always, or perhaps even usually, turn them 
into victims of domination through contract. This is no accident, for 
no modern capitalist economy does or could accept for its legal system 
29. P. 153. Pateman tries to support her claim by citing an argument of Alchian and Dem· 
setz which purports to show that even worker-owned firms founded on contracts will inevitably 
require a capitalist-style boss to prevent inefficiency and shirking. Pp. 152-53 (citing Alchian & 
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. RBV. 794-
95, 782-83 (1972)). But this argument depends upon accepting as an empirical fact the very 
conception of possessive individuals which Pateman rejects. She could try to argue that this 
conception is contingently true of people who govern their relations to one another by contracts, 
but this claim rests upon the confusion between contracts and the possessive contractarian con-
ception of contracts I am criticizing. It is also empirically false, as the existence of professional 
partnerships shows. See s. BOWLES & H. GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM 196-99 
(1986), for a critique of the Alchian and Demsetz argument. 
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an unqualified possessive contractarian conception of contract. 30 Even 
if it could, elite members of the labor force have enough bargaining 
power to secure high degrees of autonomy for themselves in labor con-
tracts. Pateman needs to offer more discriminating criteria for deter-
mining whether a given alienation of a good embodied in the person 
creates an unjust relation of domination. By attributing domination to 
the very form of a labor contract as such, Pateman preempts the de-
tailed institutional analysis required to discern those kinds of capitalist 
labor contracts that do indeed systematically create relations of domi-
nation. Such information cannot be deduced from an a priori analysis 
of the concept of the possessive individual or of the contractual aliena-
tion of goods embodied in the person. This does not imply that the 
best system for organizing labor is contractually based. But any argu-
ment for a noncontractually based labor system must depend upon an 
empirical comparison of its advantages to those of the best contractual 
systems available; it cannot be secured by an a priori proof that con-
tractual systems are irremediably evil. 
There is a further difference between possessive contractarian the-
ory and particular contracts. Possessive contractarian theory provides 
us with one understanding of the ethical dimensions and justification 
of contracts, but it does not exhaust our understandings of what we 
are doing and why we are justified in entering into or trying to reform 
particular contractual relationships. People in modern liberal societies 
do not generally see voluntary contracts as valid regardless of content, 
as the possessive model implies. But they do see some forms of con-
tractual relations as an essential means by which human beings affirm 
their autonomy and construct themselves as individuals with distinc-
tive personalities and life plans.31 While the possessive individual sees 
contracts as the sole means by which to relate freely to others, individ-
uals with different self-understandings can affirm noncontractual rela-
tions while still finding a place for contractual relations in their lives. 
The central use Pateman makes of her critique of contracts is to 
attack feminist attempts to achieve equality in marriage and in prosti-
30. The tendency of the kind of unregulated markets which would be produced by such a 
system to self-destruct has been a central theme of economic and social theory. For but three of 
the seminal works defending this thesis (each from a very different theoretical perspective), see 
J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936); K. 
MARX, CAPITAL (1867); K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). 
31. Hegel, who unequivocally rejected the conception of the possessive individual, neverthe· 
less argued that property and contracts play an important role in securing freedom and human 
personality. See G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT§ 40-80 (1896). Even Locke makes use 
of a nonpossessive conception of the individual to explain the significance of contracts. Locke 
insists that human beings, as creatures of God, do not have complete self-ownership; for exam-
ple, they are forbidden to commit suicide. J. LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 13, at § 6. Rather, Locke believes that humans have been placed on earth to carry 
forth God's mission: to protect human life, multiply, and subdue the earth, bringing forth ever 
greater production through hard work. Contracts are thus justified as the best way for human 
beings to achieve God's mission for them. 
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tution through the perfection of the sexual contract - by placing mar-
riage and prostitution on a completely contractualist basis. 32 These 
contractarian feminists attribute the presently patriarchal character of 
marriage to the fact that some of the terms of the marriage contract 
(such as the permissibility of marital rape, legal constraints on accept-
able grounds for divorce, and exclusion of provisions for husbands to 
pay wives for their services) are not negotiable, but are pre-modem 
remnants of a status society.33 The view that sexual equality in mar-
riage can be achieved under present conditions by making marriage 
into a completely contractual relationship is naive and dangerous. But 
Pateman's arguments on these points mix important insights with the 
kinds of confusions discussed above. 34 In the following discussion, I 
shall try to extract the important insights while arguing, contra 
Pateman, that they do not undermine the very idea of marriage as 
originally founded on a contract. 
The central insight which feminist theory can bring to the critique 
of contracts is to point out the patriarchal character of the "noncon-
tractual basis of contract" in past and present-day societies.35 Not all 
norms regulating human behavior can be the product of contracts, for 
the very capacity of individuals to enter into and sustain contractual 
relations depends upon their possession of certain self-understandings 
and motivations, and this in tum depends upon the prior existence of 
social practices and institutions which reproduce these self-under-
standings and motivations. Different self-conceptions, motivations, 
and background social practices make individuals capable of and will-
32. Chs. 6-7. I will not discuss the case of prostitution in this review. Sibyl Schwarzenbach 
has criticized Pateman's account of prostitution. Schwarzenbach, Contractarians and Feminists 
Debate Prostitution, - N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE - (forthcoming). Schwarzenbach is 
similarly critical of Pateman's ahistorical conception of contractual relations as inherently patri· 
archal, and of Pateman's view that contracts presuppose a possessive individual. 
33. L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW (1981); 
Barker, The Regulation of Marriage: Repressive Benevolence, in POWER AND THE STATE (G. 
Littlejohn, B. Smart, J. Wakeford & N. Yuval-Davis eds. 1978); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of 
Marriage: A New Model/or State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 207 (1982); Ketchum, Liberalism and 
Marriage Law, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English 
eds. 1977). This tradition of argument can be traced back to the nineteenth century. See J.S. 
MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869); W. THOMPSON, APPEAL OF ONE HALF OF THE 
HUMAN RACE, WOMEN, AGAINST THE PRETENSIONS OF THE OTHER HALF, MEN, TO RETAIN 
THEM IN PoLmCAL, AND THENCE IN CIVIL AND DOMESTIC, SLAVERY (1825). 
34. These confusions lead Pateman to slide without transition among characterizations of 
possessive contractarian theory in the abstract, particular views that present and past con· 
tractarian theorists have had about marriage and other contracts (which often depart from 
strictly possessive views), the actual forms of marriage and other contracts found in the past and 
present (which always depart from strictly possessive views), and forms of contract envisioned by 
contractarian feminists, as if the same ahistorical essence informed them all. Nowhere is this 
flaw more evident than in her critique of the marriage contract. Ch. 6. 
35. Hegel demonstrated the incoherence of the idea of a society comprehensively constructed 
by contractual relations in The Philosophy of Right. See G. HEGEL, supra note 31, at§§ 71-80. 
This idea became a central feature of sociological theory through the work of Emile Durkheim, 
notably in E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1964). 
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ing to enter into different kinds of contractual relations. Insofar as 
this noncontractual basis of contract is informed by patriarchal con-
ceptions of gender differences, men and women cannot enter into or 
abide by marriage (or any other) contracts on terms of complete equal-
ity, however much the form of the contract itself is framed in gender-
neutral terms. 
At least three patriarchal norms presently stand in the way of 
achieving gender equality in contracts between men and women. 
First, norms of femininity tend to socialize women as individuals who 
do not conceive of themselves as aggressive, self-seeking bargainers, 
and who hence are not motivated to act on such a self-conception. 
Thus, a woman who identifies herself primarily as a caregiver and un-
derstands her actions as directed toward the creation of relationships 
based on gift exchange is vulnerable to contractual exploitation by 
men who identify with the possessive model of the individual. 36 
Second, norms of heterosexual relationships frame the exchange of 
goods between men and women asymmetrically, giving an inevitable 
advantage even to men who seek an equal relationship with their fe-
male partners. Thus, a man who gives up career advantages in order 
to take up equal responsibilities for housework and childrearing has 
made a great sacrifice relative to his peers and has thus "earned" a 
gratitude from his wife that he does not owe to her, for this arrange-
ment makes her a gainer relative to her peers. 37 
Third, norms of heterosexual relationships construe the very acts 
of offer and acceptance asymmetrically. When these norms prescribe 
that the man initiates all proposals (thereby excluding from considera-
tion those proposals he, but not she, would find only barely accepta-
ble), or when submission to greater power is counted as acceptance 
and women are trained in submission, sexual agreements between men 
and women can hardly be expected to make them equals.38 Feminists 
who fail to recognize, and hence fail to criticize, the noncontractual 
basis of the marriage contract, inevitably reproduce the patriarchal 
domination they try to escape when they attempt to place relations 
with men on a fully contractual basis. 
These considerations, not to mention the unequal bargaining 
power of women derived from their unequal economic standing, make 
it folly for feminists. to seek marital equality solely through the perfec-
tion and gender-neutralization of the marriage contract. Pateman 
goes even further, claiming that the inherently patriarchal character of 
36. I have recently explored this problem in relation to surrogate motherhood contracts. See 
Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 71 (1990). 
37. Arlie Hochschild makes this observation in A. HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART 85 
(1983). Hochschild's book contains a superb study of the asymmetrical norms governing the 
claims men and women may make on one another in the realm of "emotional labor." 
38. Pateman, supra note 12, at 156-57. 
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contract undermines the whole idea of marriage as founded upon a 
contract. A marriage contract inherently involves a conception of pos-
sessive individuals who alienate their sexual property for the exclusive 
use of their partner. But since it is only the masculine individual who 
can be imagined as expressing his sexuality through the appropriation 
of another person's sexual property (p. 185), a marriage contract in-
herently makes the woman subordinate to the man (p. 168). 
Pateman, like the contractarian feminists she criticizes, mistakenly 
supposes that the only conception of contract available to us is one 
which relies on a conception of agreement as founded on self-inter-
ested bargaining for the exchange of exclusively appropriated goods. 
But a contract is just a freely established agreement creating obliga-
tions between consenting adults. It can take other forms besides a pos-
sessive one. It can, for instance, be constituted by a mutual 
commitment to construct a common life based upon gifts whose value 
for one party depends on their being shared rather than offered up for 
exclusive possession. To deny that this kind of relationship can also be 
recognizably contractual is to deny the variety of understandings we 
actually bring to different contractual forms. 39 Of course, the achieve-
ment of such a nonmarket form of a contractually founded relation-
ship camiot be secured simply by the will of the parties. A 
fundamental revision of "the noncontractual basis of contract," in-
cluding deep changes in the presently constructed forms of masculin-
ity and femininity, would have to take place before such contracts 
could be fully realized. 40 
Pateman's analysis not only confuses contracts with contractarian 
theory, Jmt possessive contractarianism with other forms of the theory. 
Possessive contractarianism neither exhausts the meanings of contract 
in modern society, nor the content of modern social contract theory. 
Modern social contract theory is founded on the idea that the legiti-
mate forms of social or political order are those which are (or could 
be) agreed to by free, equal, and rational individuals under initial con-
ditions which are fair. It is divided into two general branches: the 
39. Indeed, the marriage contract, for all its patriarchal character, rejects the model of pos-
sessive individuals which Pateman claims lies at the core of modern patriarchy. Even today, 
most modern legal systems express a conception of the marriage contract as creating and uphold-
ing a form of commitment which transcends the will of the parties - hence the need to cite 
grounds for divorce beyond mutual consent in order to dissolve the contract. And the social 
norms of the marriage contract go far beyond its legally enforced norms in departing from a 
possessive model. 
40. In making these claims about marriage, I do not wish to endorse the view that the con-
tent of a worthwhile marriage is exhausted by the terms of the original marriage contract. But if 
marriage is not to be a freely established relation of legal status between two consenting adults, 
and hence founded originally in a contract, then what is it to be? It might be the case that, given 
her analysis of heterosexuality as the eroticization of the domination of women, Pateman rejects 
the institution of heterosexual marriage, however founded, and advocates instead a radical les· 
bian separatism for women. But she does not go this far in her book. Her critique of marriage is 
hampered by a failure to offer a rival vision of sexuality and personal community. 
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possessive versions, which accept the model of the possessive individ-
ual as the free individual, along with the idea of free markets as consti-
tuting the paradigmatically fair conditions for making contracts, 41 and 
those versions which reject possessive individuals and markets as ap-
propriate starting points for moral and political inquiry.42 Given the 
tendency of social orders constituted by possessive individuals and free 
markets to generate systematic forms of human oppression and domi-
nation, the possessive models would appear to be among the less 
promising versions of contractarianism. If modem social contract the-
ory is to be demonstrated to be inherently patriarchal, some attention 
must be given to those forms of it, such as Rawls', which are arguably 
more central to the liberal tradition than libertarian forms are, and 
which explicitly repudiate possessive models of the self. Yet in The 
Sexual Contract, Pateman offers only feeble and well-worn criticisms 
of Rawlsian social contract theory.43 
I do not wish to claim that Rawls' version of contractarianism is 
beyond feminist criticism, 44 or that social contract theory is the best 
tool for feminists to pursue the goal of eradicating sexist oppression. 
Pateman shows that possessive contractarianism has patriarchal ori-
gins, and that it legitimates the patriarchal domination of women 
through contracts today. She does not show that all contractarian the-
41. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); D. 
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); R. NOZICK, supra note 25. 
42. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilita-
rianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982). 
43. See pp. 42-43. Rawls articulates a clearly nonpossessive model of the individual in 
Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980). Pateman equivocates on 
the meaning of contractarianism. She begins by identifying it with what is known in the United 
States as libertarianism. P. 14. But full-blooded libertarianism is by now a marginal strain in 
modem liberal political theory, hardly a big enough target to cast doubt on social contract the-
ory, or liberalism more generally, if it is undermined. Moreover, she goes on to criticize Rawls, 
as if her analysis applies to him. Pp. 42-43. In fact, her criticisms echo familiar ones in the 
literature, based on the misunderstanding of Rawls which supposes that his model of the parties 
in the original contract, who are abstracted from their bodies and from most self-knowledge, 
represents his theory of the individual. She also supposes, quite mistakenly, that when Rawls 
conceives of the parties in the original position as heads of families, he must think that only men 
are represented there. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 223, 238-40 (1985) (parties in original position are merely political constructs, not intended 
to give comprehensive theory of persons); J. RAWLS, supra note 42, at 128 (parties conceived as 
heads of families or in some other way concerned about people in future generations). 
44. Rawls' assumption that the "basic structure" of society - which is the subject of his 
theory of justice - excludes the domestic sphere of marriage and the family is particularly vul-
nerable to feminist critique. See J. RAWLS, supra note 42, at 8, 74, 301, 511-12. In excluding 
from political scrutiny the sexual division of labor in the domestic sphere, as well as the social 
construction of gender differences which supports relations of sexual domination, Rawls mistak-
enly assumes that inequalities in the domestic sphere are of a natural and inescapable, rather than 
a political, nature, and that such inequalities do not unjustly affect the distribution of "primary 
goods" supposedly in the control of the basic structure. See Pateman, supra note 21, at 123 n.6. 
Recognition of these facts might not change Rawls' formulation of the principles of justice, or 
undermine his contractarian approach, but it would certainly require a radical reconstruction of 
the liberal division of public and private spheres which Rawls takes for granted. 
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ories, or all contracts involving women's sexuality, necessarily suffer 
from the same fatal flaw. So whether contracts and contractarianism, 
or political theories which look beyond contracts and contractual jus-
tifications, are the best vehicle for feminist projects is a matter which 
requires a detailed development and comparison of the alternatives. 
And such a comparison cannot be a matter merely of ideological anal-
ysis, but must evaluate how different experiments fare in practice. 
